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LOOKING AT MARRIAGE
Naomi Cahn*

ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE. By
Milton C. Regan, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp.
x, 279. $45.
In a recent book (not the subject of this Review), highly successful
and popular authors John Gottman and Nan Silver set out their seven
effective principles for making a marriage last. The final suggestion is
that spouses should "create shared meaning, an inner life together that
is rich with symbols and family rituals and that honors the hopes of
both partners."1 In a happy marriage, the couples not only provide
support for each other, but also "build a sense of purpose into their
lives together."2 Professor Gottman has developed these principles as
a result of twenty years of research and observation of happily and
unhappily married couples. Based on the interaction between couples
in his Love Lab, he can predict, with over 90% accuracy, which cou
ples will stay together and which will divorce.3
In Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage, Professor
Milton Regan4 also examines the state of contemporary American
marriage, and he too argues for recognizing the importance of shared
meaning between the partners (p. 5), and commitment to the marriage
as an entity rather than simply to the individual lives of the spouses.
He bases his prescription for the institution of marriage on an exami-

* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. - Ed. The author
thanks Katharine Baker, Adam Becker, Brian Bix, June Carbone, Jane Murphy, Trisha
Smith, Michelle Wu, and George Washington University Law School.

1. JOHN GOITMAN & NAN SILVER, SEVEN PRINCIPLES FOR MAKING A MARRIAGE
WORK 23 {1999). The other six principles are: 1) know the intimate details of your spouse's
world; 2) foster your fondness and respect of each other; 3) look to your spouse rather than
away; 4) allow your spouse to affect and influence you; 5) resolve the problems that you can;
and 6) move away from gridlock to discussion. See id.
In her recent book based on a study of 160 men and women in intimate relationships in
three countries, researcher Sally Cline found that the following issues determined the success
of a married couple: "Commitment, Co=unication, Coping with Change, Cherishing, and
Compromise . . . and Interdependence: the balance between dependence and independ
ence." SALLY CLINE, COUPLES: SCENES FROM TiiE INSIDE 15 {1999).
2. GOTrMAN & SILVER, supra note 1, at 23.
3. See Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, The Science of a Good Marriage,
Apr. 19, 1999, at 54; Philip Weiss, Is this Marriage on the Rocks, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2000, at 61.

NEWSWEEK,

4. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
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nation of three different issues: first, the accuracy of the law and eco
nomics approach to marriage; second, the continuing validity of the
spousal evidentiary privileges; and third, the division of property be
tween spouses upon divorce. Like Gottman and Silver, Regan is con
cerned about contemporary marriage. Unlike Gottman and Silver,
however, Regan_ focuses on the cultural institution and societal mean
ings of marriage rather than on the meaning of marriage to any par
ticular couple.
Professor Regan is an extremely thoughtful scholar of the family
and of marriage. In a previous book, he argued for a reinvigoration of
status-based responsibilities in family law in order to foster greater
intimacy between family members.5 Alone Together continues the ar
gument, placing it in the context of political conversations about the
relationship between self and community.
Marriage clearly requires the individual spouses to balance their
own identities with their identity as a couple,6 and it thus simultane
ously implicates issues of interconnection and individual fairness.
Alone Together identifies two different stances in marriage that impli
cate both individual spouse and marital entity: an external stance,
which is identified with the individual's benefit, and an internal stance,
which is identified with the community. By clearly articulating these
tensions within marriage, Regan offers an extremely useful perspective
on marriage. Indeed, the strength of this book is in its persuasive de
scriptions of the critical nature of both care and justice within mar
riage, and the difficulty of balancing them.
The question that remains after reading this extremely thought
provoking book is: why marriage?7 If anyone can defend the institu
tion, then this select company includes Regan.8 There have been many
other defenders of marriage as an institution who argue, from a con
ser\rative slant, that it will lift wome.n out of poverty, provide fathers
for children, reweave the moral fabric of America, and, in general,
save our society.9 Regan, being far more measured and thoughtful,
5. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993)
[hereinafter REGAN, FAMILY LAW] . For a sympathetic and perceptive review, see Margaret
Brinig, Status, Contract, and Covenant, 19 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (1994) (book review).
6. See Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The Ethics of Marital
Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (1998).
7. This question should not be confused with another, recently posed and answered by
E.J. Graff. See EJ. GRAFF, WHAT ISMARRIAGE FOR? (1999). .
8. Of course, there have been other persuasive defenders as well, including Yale Law
School Professor William Eskridge. See WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME
.

SEX MARRIAGE (1996).

9. See, e.g., Institute for American Values, Press Release, Sept. 22, 1999, at 1 (visited
Feb. 16, 2000) <llttp://www.americanvalues.org/Unwedmothers.htm> (reviewing MAGGIE
GALLAGHER, THE AGE OF UNWED MOTHERS: IS TEEN PREGNANCY THE PROBLEM?
(1999)) ("For Gallagher, the key to understanding the teen pregnancy crisis is mar
riage . . . . )
"

.
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eloquently defends marriage on behalf of married people rather than
as the solution to all of society's alleged ills.
In this Review, I will first discuss Professor Regan's observations
on marriage. In the second Part, I will question the utility of marriage
itself: why not allow adults to choose their own means of commitment
to each other and/or to others? Regardless of what is happening to the
state of contemporary marriage, adults are committed to the family as
a functional institution, rather than to particular rigid forms.
Next, I will question the applicability of Regan's conclusions to
women, poor people, and nonwhite people. For example, in Regan's
critique of the economic approach to marriage, he does not mention
the special problems of poor people for whom a law and economics
approach provides little explanatory power. Indeed, there are a series
of special issues concerning marriage that these groups confront.
The two different stances on marriage that Regan articulates are
critical to an understanding and appreciation of marriage and its role
in society. Regan has made an accurate diagnosis that both stances
reflect important moments in marriage, but that there may be some
unavoidable tensions between them. In his analysis of the law and
economics approach, spousal privilege, and divorce financial awards,
he suggests that an external stance neglects important aspects that are
indeed captured through the internal stance. Accordingly, perhaps
our culture should focus more on the marital relationship than on the
rights of each individual spouse. But I believe it is necessary to look
deeper. Within each marriage, gendered expectations affect which
spouse is relationally-focused and which spouse is fairness-focused,
and thus the individuals within each relationship should acknowledge
the insights of both stances and seek a more equitable "internal" bal
ance.
I.

THEBOOK

Before turning to the book, I want to discuss briefly the state of
contemporary American marriage. Marriage has become, indeed, has
always been, a crucible for examining and solving all of society's
problems. The movement toward covenant marriage in Louisiana and
many other states is symbolic of a perceived decline in commitment to
marriage continuity, and of attempts to preserve the besieged institu
tion of marriage.10 There is also much hand-wringing over the per
ceived decline in commitment to marriage itself, given the number of
10. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 9:272-75 (West Supp. 2000); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25-901 to 906 (West Supp. 1999); Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault
Based Divorce Reform Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 611, 619-20 (1999); Gary H. Nichols, Note, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee
Join the Nobel Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 397 (1999).
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cohabitating couples. Many scholars have suggested that the increase
in the divorce rate over the past three decades indicates that the public
views contemporary marriage as nothing more than a contract for self
fulfillment.11 As a result of an increasing societal emphasis on per
sonal psychological happiness, they believe that the focus in marriage
is no longer on others, but on the individual's own self-fulfillment.12
The new ideology of families celebrates, in the words of one critic, the
"Love Family,"13 which is based on choice and voluntary affiliation
with another adult rather than on the commitment traditionally asso
ciated with marriage. Instead of living within an ethic that celebrates
relationships and obligations to others, the new ethic celebrates obli
gations only to oneself. Vulnerability and dependence (and marriage
itself) are useful, according to this critique, only when they further in
dividual happiness. For example, while many parents used to believe
it was important to stay together for the children, this is no longer
true.14 One recent report summarized these contemporary concerns
about marriage:
The popular culture strongly reinforces th [e] sense of pessimism, even
doom about the chances for marital success . . . .
Marriage is losing much of its status and authority as a social institu
tion . . . .
For most Americans, marriage is a 'couples relationship' desired primar
ily to meet the sexual and emotional needs of the spouses . . . . People
tend to be puzzled or put off by the idea that marriage has purposes or

11. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, for example, blames the high divorce rate on individuals'
desire for self-fulfillment at the expense of commitment and nurturing. See BARBARA
WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 4, 6 (1997); see also Carl E. Schneider, Marriage,
Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503; see
generally Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225
(1997) (book review).
12 See Whitehead, supra note 11, at 54. Professor Regan has pointed out "doubt that
there is any genuine consensus about what marriage is and what its moral obligations ought
to be." Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 605, 608 [hereinafter Regan, Market Discourse]. There is even doubt that
marriage should connote a special status. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
Regardless of the future of marriage, it does carry with it certain privileges and images; this
Article is based on the existing institution of marriage.
13. Whitehead, supra note 11, at 144, 152.
14. Whitehead cites a study that asked women in 1962 whether they believed that par
ents who did not get along with each other should stay together for the children. Fifty-one
percent did not believe this was appropriate. By 1977, 80% did not think this was appropri
ate. See id. at 82. Studies of why people divorce affirm Whitehead's conclusions with respect
to the changing reasons for divorce. According to several studies, failure of communication
or feeling unloved are the most frequent reasons given for divorce. See CATHERINE
KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK (1990); Lynn Gigy & Joan B. Kelly, Reason for Di
vorce: Perspectives ofDivorcing Men and Women, 18 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 169, 186
(1992). Historically, there has also been a shift in the reasons for divorce. See generally
GRAFF, supra note 7.
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benefits that extend beyond fulfilling individual adult needs for intimacy
and satisfaction.15

Within the law, the shift toward individual fulfillment and away
from state control is seen in the concern over privatization. The ar
gument is that there has been a shift from state intervention and state
imposed norms toward more private decisionmaking.16 Professor Jana
Singer carefully points out the many areas in which private contracting
has replaced more public ordering, ranging from premarital contract
ing to adoption.17 In addition, she suggests that the distinction be
tween marital status and nonmarital status is diminishing.18
Notwithstanding all of this hand-wringing about the declining im
portance of marriage, the marriage rate today is comparable to the
marriage rate in the late nineteenth century.19 While the marriage rate
peaked for those born during the 1920s and 1930s, and has been de
clining since, the institution of marriage is not disappearing.20 Even
when people leave first marriages, they overwhelmingly return to the
institution by remarrying. Indeed, as an example of the appeal of mar15. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WIDTEHEAD, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS:

THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 4-6 (1999).

16. See Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 25 (1996).
17. See Jana Singer, The Privatization ofFamily Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443. Others,
with varying levels of approval, have also documented the increasing privatization of family
law and the corresponding power of individuals to enter into contracts with respect to issues
that were formerly a matter solely of domestic relations law. See, e.g., p. 5; Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV.
204 (1982). For other perspectives, see MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE
(1989); Janet Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82
GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994).
18. See Singer, supra note 17, at 1447-56.
19. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE (Rev. ed. 1992);
HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, THE AGE OF THE BACHELOR: CREATING AN AMERICAN
SUBCULTURE (1999); Peter Brimelow, Too Many Bachelors?, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1999, at 143
(reporting that 31 % of contemporary American men have never been married, but 44% had
never married a century ago, and the percentage of contemporary married women is the
same as a century ago).
20. See CHERLIN, supra note 19, at 10-11. Cherlin explains:
More than 90 percent of the women in every birth cohort on record (records extend back to
the mid-1800s) have eventually married. The adults who came of age after World War II
have the highest lifetime percentage married . . . . [R]ecent estimates suggest that the lifetime
percentage married among women born during the baby boom may fall below the historical
minimum of 90 percent by a percentage point or two.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The percentage of men and women over age 35 who have never married is lower today
than it was in 1950. See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. B!ANCI-Il, BALANCING ACT:
MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 27, tbl. 2.2
(1996). Spain and Bianchi also note that the median age at first marriage is increasing and
that women who marry at an older age are less likely to divorce {although more likely to
have nonmarital children). See id. at 26.
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riage, consider the efforts of gay activists to make marriage available
to same-sex partners.21 Broadening access to marriage is an attempt to
reinforce the importance of marriage, rather than an attempt to un
dermine it.22
Marriage has always served state interests, regardless of the indi
vidual economic and social interests of spouses. Underlying its lan
guage of companionship, marriage is a public status that historically
has been regulated publicly to serve the purposes of the state.23 It is,
then, simultaneously an intensely private relationship and an ex
tremely public status that has been manipulated to support prevailing
public images of morality and social order. For example, Professor
Nancy Cott shows how the federal government manipulated notions of
citizenship during the nineteenth century based on a woman's marital
status in order to form and reinforce appropriate gender roles.24 Thus,
in 1855, Congress enacted a statute providing that a woman who mar
ried a male citizen of the United States herself became a citizen, with
out making any provision for marriage to a female citizen; Cott argues
that this "underline[s] customary male headship of the marital couple
as a civic and political norm."25 Judges in the nineteenth century re
fused to allow spouses to divorce each other except upon a finding of
fault; even when judges were granted enormous discretion to allow a
divorce based on incompatibility, they forced marriages to continue
because of the public interest in the marital status and because of ex
treme antipathy to allowing parties to determine the terms of their
marriage contracts.26 Moreover, marriage used to control sexuality
and the legitimacy of children.27

21. There is extensive literature on this. See generally, e.g., EsKRIDGE, supra note 8.
22. Some gay activists have argued that allowing same-sex marriage will, in fact, under
mine the institution. That is not, however, the primary argument offered by most same-sex
marriage advocates who seek access to marriage because they respect the existing institution
and its privileges. See id.; see also Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist
Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gen
der in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day
Forward: A Feminb:ze Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE LJ. 1783 (1988).
23. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the
Law ofMarriage in the United States, 1860-1920, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 541 (1998).

24. See Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States,
103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1442 (1998).

1830-

1934,

25. Id. at 1456 (emphasis in original).
26. See Naomi Cahn, Finding Fault, Presentation at American Society for Legal History
Annual Meeting (October 1999); see also HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA
63-92 (forthcoming 2000).
27. See Lindsay, supra note 23, at 547.
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Judges and legislatures have used marriage as a means to privatize
dependence, to foster women's dependence on men.28 By finding a
marriage when evidence was doubtful as to its existence, judges have
made men, not the state, responsible for women's financial needs. In
cases where women sought to establish a common law marriage, a
finding in their favor served simultaneously to privatize and moralize
their relationships.29 Thus, marriage has always involved public and
private interests - and, of course, public regulation is intimately inter
twined with those private interests that are protected by, and in, mar
riage.30
Professor Regan begins the book by examining the different pri
vate interests that are at the "heart" of marriage. The central concept
of Alone Together is the distinction between two different approaches
to marriage that exist simultaneously within any marriage: "an 'exter
nal' stance [which] represents an individual's capacity to reflect criti
cally upon, rather than simply identify with her commitments and at
tachments ... [and an] 'internal' stance [in which] marriage appears as
a universe of shared meaning that serves as the taken-for-granted
background for individual conduct" (p. 5). The external stance allows
individuals to evaluate for themselves the costs and benefits of any
particular relationship, and to assess, independently, whether their
self-interest is advanced (pp. 17-18). It is characterized by concepts
such as consent, justice, equality, and contract (p. 24).
By contrast, the internal stance focuses on the individual as em
bedded in connection with others. It is concerned with sustaining rela
tionships; it "tends to blur the boundary between self and other" (p.
25), and it requires trust (pp. 24-25). Unlike the external stance,
where obligations to the other spouse develop as a result of contract or
consent, obligations to the other spouse that are based on the internal
stance develop as a result of the relationship itself (p. 26). The identity
of each spouse does not exist independently of the other, but is, at
least partially, defined by the existence of the marriage (p. 25). While
the external stance is associated with traditional liberalism and with an
ethic of justice, the internal stance "has some affinities with both the
communitarian critique of liberalism and with emphasis on an ethic of
care."31 Regan argues that both perspectives are critical to a marriage
but that the stances are "irreducible to one another" (p. 29).
28. See generally Lindsay, supra note 23; Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through
Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885 (1997).
29. See generally Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common
Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 718 (1996).
30. See generally Lindsay, supra note 23; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State lnterven·
tion in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History
and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV.1135, 1174-79.
31. P. 27. The ethics of justice and care are associated with the work of Carol Gilligan.
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) [hereinafter GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT
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In a wonderful passage in the book, Regan uses a scene from Amy
Tan's novel, The Joy Luck Club, to dramatize the awkwardness of
autonomy without community in marriage.32 The mother of Lena, the
main character, notices the careful accounting of expenses between
her daughter and son-in-law with a bottom line that her daughter will
owe money to her son-in-law; Lena explains that she and her husband
want to " 'eliminate false dependencies ... be equals ... love without
obligation' " (p. 23). As Regan observes, this couple is missing the
richness and interdependence of relationship that is inherent in our
cultural concept of marriage. "Genuine intimacy, however, seems to
demand that she also be able to take an internal stance from which the
relationship is taken as a given without references to the individual
costs and benefits."33 Ultimately, these two different stances express
tensions in our culture outside of marriage, explains Regan. His ex
ploration of marriage serves as merely one example, albeit an impor
tant one, of tensions between the individual and the community, ten
sions that are central to liberal and communitarian thought (p.30).
Having established the two distinct stances, Regan applies them in
three different marriage-related contexts to show the necessity of bal
ance rather than complete reliance on one stance or the other. First,
Regan examines the economic, or market approach to marriage,
looking at the rhetoric of the law and economics perspective. He re
turns to the economic approach to marriage in the third part of the
book, when he examines property distribution upon divorce. Second,
Regan examines the two different forms of privileges for spouses
called to testify against each other. Although Regan observes that his
articulation of the tensions between the two stances does not resolve
all of the dilemmas of modem marriage (p.205), he does indicate his
preference for resolving these dilemmas: he believes that it is impor
tant for society to shift toward more of an internal stance.
In Part II, Markets and Marriage, and Part IV, Money and Divorce,
Regan examines the impact of market-based discourses on the family.
VOICE] ; Carol Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in Relationships
in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION 3 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter
Gilligan, Remapping]. She has suggested that the ethic of care correlates with the way that

many women approach the world because it focuses on relationships between people. See id.
at 7. An ethic of justice focuses on legal, abstract, and hierarchical rights. See id. at 8. See
also generally Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1039 (1992); Naomi R.
Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1991); Carrie Menkel
Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 75 (1994).
32.

AMY TAN, THE JOY LUCK CLUB

160-65 (1989).

33. P. 24. Further support of Regan's perspective occurs shortly after Lena's explana
tion to her mother, when Lena confronts her husband: "Why do you have to be so goddamn
fair! . . . We need to think about what our marriage is really based on . . . not this balance
sheet, who owes who what." TAN, supra note 32, at 164-65.
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Although Part II focuses on the rhetoric of law and economics, and
Part IV focuses on the rhetoric and reality of a property-based per
spective, both parts of the book are concerned with the implications of
the external stance involving the economics of marriage and the con
cepts of spouses as independent, contracting actors.
A. Money, Contracts, and Economics
Regan begins his application of the internal and external stances to
contemporary family law issues by describing the law and economics
approach to the family. He explores the increasingly widespread use
of this discourse to describe contemporary family life, and then cri
tiques the approach.
The most prominent proponents of this approach - e.g., Gary
Becker and Richard Posner - argue that spouses participate in a mar
riage market; if the overall utility of becoming married outweighs the
overall utility of remaining single, then individuals will get married (p.
35). They argue, first, that labor specialization, in which one family
member works primarily in the market sector, and the other in the
household sector, maximizes utility.34 Second, they argue that intrinsic
differences between men and women dictate that women are more
biologically suited to staying home and raising the children while men,
of course, are better suited to market production.35 Women inevitably
have different preferences for market jobs.36 Women specialize in
building the human capital of their children and husbands, while men
specialize in market capital.37 Traditional gender roles, in which the
woman stays home while the man is the breadwinner, provide the
most efficient mechanism for family resource allocation; and this is the
way of measuring marital success because "happiness or utility or wel
fare [are] synonyms." 38 In sum, marriage is seen "as a rational joint
venture that involves bargaining over and implicit exchange of re
sources. " 39
34. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-21 (1981).
35. See id. at 21-22. The sociobiologists agree with this second point. Judge Posner
points out two causes for women staying home: first, sex discrimination in the labor market
means that women earn less than men; and second, because "women bear the children and
are better adapted to child (especially infant) care, the wife's costs of household production
will be lower than the husband's." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
157 (5th ed. 1998).
36. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to
Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 93-94 (1993) (discussing what she terms the
"supply-side preference" theory).

37. See BECKER, supra note 34, at 23.
38.
39.

POSNER, supra note 35, at 157 (alteration added).

P. 37. As economists take pains to emphasize, of course, "rational" does not mean
calculated. As Posner explains at the beginning of his textbook on law and economics:

May 2000]

Looking at Marriage

1775

Regan then examines how this approach is consistent with the ex
ternal stance. First, like the external stance, law and economics begins
with the preferences of the individual actor (p. 48). Second, law and
economics emphasizes private ordering - agreements and contracts
- as the appropriate means for structuring relationships (p. 51). He
suggests also that the economic approach is beneficial for women be
cause, among other things, it can provide a basis for arguing for a more
equal allocation of resources between the spouses (p. 60). This is so
because it clarifies the economic benefits and losses experienced by
each spouse in marriage. Moreover, he argues that the economic ap
proach to marriage, like the external stance, calls attention to the need
to acknowledge the spouses' self-interest. Regan believes "[t]he eco
nomic emphasis on individual interest, consent, and fair exchange may
offer a useful corrective to a language of sharing that sometimes has
been used to cloak women's disadvantage" (p. 61).
Indeed, some feminist scholars have begun to reassess the utility of
the economic approach to marriage. Their present goal is to ensure
that caregiving and housework are "counted" as economic contribu
tions.40 Professor Katharine Silbaugh questions whether the visceral
reaction against market discourse in the family is a means of under
mining women's power within the home.41 She argues that opposition
to market discourse may deprive women of the benefits they should
receive from performing labor in the household.42 Silbaugh argues for
the importance of increasing the status of housework in order to in
crease the status of women both inside and outside of the home.43 She
carefully documents the contemporary legal approach throughout a
variety of different fields (divorce, tax, contract, etc.) toward the deEconomics is not a theory about consciousness. Behavior is rational when it conforms to the
model of rational choice, whatever the state of mind of the chooser . . . . And self·interest
should not be confused with selfishness; the happiness . . . of other people may be part of
one's satisfactions.

POSNER, supra note 35, at 4; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
ECONOMICS 10-11 {2d ed. 1997).

AND

40. Shirley Burggraf argues for economic incentives to continue parental investment in
their children. See SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC
MAN: REVIVING THEROLE OFFAMILYJNTHEPOST-lNDUSTRIALAGE {1996).
41. See Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 84 {1997) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Commodification].
42 See id. at 95; see also Julie A. Nelson, OfMarkets and Martyrs: Is it OK to Pay Well
for Care?, FEMINIST ECON., Fall 1999, at 43, 45, 56 (arguing for a reconceptualization of
markets as feminizing within a larger set of societal relationships).
43. See Silbaugh, Commodification, supra note 41, at 121 {"Understanding the economic
aspects of women's non-market activity is an important part of the transformative vision of
progressive feminism."); see also Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework
and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 {1996) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love].
Professor Nancy Staudt believes that imposing truces on housework could help change the
gendered nature of work. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. LJ. 1571, 1635
{1996).

Michigan Law Review

1776

[Vol. 98:1766

valuation of housework as work, and toward its valuation as "merely"
affectionately based, and thus not worthy of compensation.44 Jana
Singer suggests that privatization may be advantageous to women be
cause it eliminates some of the "sexism and hierarchy of traditional
family rules" in marriage, promotes diversity within family relation
ships, increases people's control and autonomy within reproduction
and other family-related activities, and may serve as a means of
reaching "a more just form of public ordering."45 Within a law-and
economics model, Professor Amy Wax has argued that the traditional
story is inadequate.46 Instead, she posits that women's caretaking
work generates positive externalities by benefiting third parties (for
example, the children themselves) as well as by creating public goods.47
Consequently, a woman's return on her labor is artificially diminished
because these positive externalities are received gratuitously.48 She
suggests that a normative goal should be determining how to ade
quately compensate women for their entire contribution, including the
gratuitously conferred benefits. While the language is couched in eco
nomic terms, the goal is to protect specialization in the internal stance.
Nonetheless, Regan suggests the limitations of the law and eco
nomics approach. That approach, he argues, claims to explain all be
havior within marriage, even altruistic actions, but behavioral research
fails to support the economic explanation (pp. 62-63). Taking an "ex
ternal" approach to law and economics, that is, critiquing its underly
ing assumptions,49 he argues that it cannot account for the interper
sonal connection and social behavior associated with the internal
stance. Spouses are not simply rational, utility-maximizing individuals
at all times within marriage. They are, instead, concerned about each
other: "an understanding of behavior as noninstrumental, undertaken
solely for the sake of the other, is perhaps the essential norm that
guides the behavior of persons in close relationships" (p. 74). By
overlooking the behavior associated with the internal stance, and by
attempting to explain such actions solely through a rational basis ac
count, the economic approach can provide only a partial explanation
44. See Silbaugh, Commodification, supra
Turning Labor into Love, supra note 43.
45. Singer, supra note 17, at 1565.

note 41, at 82-83;

see generally

Silbaugh,

See also id. at 1533-40, 1565-67.

46. See Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 44 VILL. L.
REV. 495 (1999) [hereinafter Wax, Caring Enough]; see generally Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Market: ls There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509
(1998).
47.

See Wax, Caring Enough, supra note 46, at 513.

48.

See id.

49. Professor Brian Bix usefully distinguishes between "internal" and "external" cri
tiques of law and economics; the internal critique accepts most of the law and economics
basic approach. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 196 (2d ed.
1999).
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of marriage. Indeed, the research of social scientists on incentives for
individualistic behavior indicates that "helping and cooperation can
occur without the prospect of individual reward" (p. 66). Drawing ex
tensively on the work of social psychologists and other empirical
studies, Regan shows that individuals often act in ways that are inex
plicable through a focus solely on personal rewards (pp. 70-73).
While the concept of "efficiency" can be viewed as descriptive
rather than normative, Regan suggests that the alleged differences
between positive and normative discourse may be illusory (p. 47).
Regan, elsewhere, has asserted that the law and economics approach
appears to be neutral but this alleged neutrality is in fact normative.50
Regan returns to the economic approach to marriage in the third
section of Alone Together when he examines the rhetoric surrounding
property division at divorce. Divorce law, he argues, historically ap
proached spouses as partners and created post-dissolution obligations
based on the past relationship. The contemporary approach, however,
views spouses as "strangers," for whom the "imagery of the market" is
especially useful (p. 141). When divorce was based on fault grounds
alone, there was, according to Regan, a conceptual basis for awarding
alimony because the faulting spouse should not be excused from his
financial obligations under the marriage contract (p. 144). Regan does
recognize this as a somewhat idealistic view of alimony. He notes that
relatively few women received alimony even under a fault-based re
gime, and they did not receive a great deal of money.51 Nonetheless,
he observes that, pursuant to a no-fault regime, the traditional justifi
cations are no longer valid. In response, theorists have developed
various other rationales to justify continuing financial obligations be
tween former spouses. Regan explains and then critiques theories
based on human capital that attempt to provide a coherent basis for
alimony, by arguing that these theories are based on an external stance
toward marriage.
The two human capital theories that he explores provide justifica
tions for alimony based on the spouses' expectation and reliance inter
ests. Human capital theories emphasize the increase in earning poten
tial that marriage has facilitated; typically, one spouse has maximized
50.

See Regan, Market Discourse, supra note 12, at 608-09.

51. P. 144; see also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WOMEN 23, 470 (1991) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 141,
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1983 (1985)). The data shows that the percentage of
women who received alimony under no-fault was comparable to the percentage of women
who received alimony in the 1920s. See Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commit
ment to Children: The New Language ofMorality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111
{1999). Professor Regan also notes that the internal stance reflected by fault rhetoric cir
cumscribed women's lives more than men's. Seep. 143. He concludes, however, that "fault
based divorce featured a coherent discourse of divorce awards that expressed the importance
of an internal stance toward marriage." P. 144.
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his earnings while the other spouse has provided the domestic support
that enables him to do so.5 2 According to the expectation version, the
supportive spouse is entitled to a reasonable return on her investment
in the other spouse's human capital.5 3 She should receive the benefit
of her bargain.
The second version of human capital theory would compensate
spouses for the economic loss suffered upon divorce. Because the
supporting spouse contributed and sacrificed so that her spouse could
increase his income, she is entitled to recover for these contributions�4
she receives her reliance interest. Under each of these theories, how
ever, Regan argues that the spouses are treated as virtual strangers
who, as a result of a "contract" with each other, become entitled to
share in the enhanced earnings made possible by the contract (pp. 15758).
In response to the faults in these human capital theories stemming
from the external perspective, Regan offers some different notions.
His alternatives are based on an internal stance toward marriage
which does not include an exact measure of compensation for each
spouse's contributions to the marriage (p. 190). Instead, he advocates
equalizing the spouses' standard of living for some time period after
the divorce.5 5 Such a proposal, he argues, values the domestic labor
52. P. 148; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 124-25 (2000).

WHY FAMILY AND WORK

53. Pp. 149-53. Professor Regan cites the work of Joan Krauskopf and Cynthia Starnes.
See Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for
the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 {1980); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce
and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyollls and
Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993). For further discussion, see Joan
M. Krauskopf, Theories ofProperty Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solllfions to the
Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253 (1989); Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and
Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573 (1988).
Professors June Carbone and Margaret Brinig distinguish between expectation, reliance,
and restitutionary theories for post-divorce recovery, arguing that the expectation interest is
what the wife would have received had the marriage continued, the reliance interest protects
the opportunities lost as a result of the marriage, and the restitutionary interest is the wife's
investment in the husband's human capital. See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Re
thinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 953, 958-61, 986 {1991).
54. Pp. 153-57 (relying on theories of Ira Ellman and Allen Parkman). The concept of
"economic loss" has become part of the American Law Institute's draft principles for family
dissolution; Professor Ellman is the Chief Reporter. Pp. 156, 259 n.126.
55. Pp. 190-92. He cites to Singer's proposal that the duration of this alimony be calcu
lated as follows: one year of equalization for two years of marriage. See Jana B. Singer,
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1117-18 (1989). Professor Singer
has provided further discussion of this proposal in Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency:
The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2423, 2454 (1999). See also Joan Williams, ls Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ. 2227, 2260-61 (1994); see generally June Carbone, Income Sharing:
Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 359, 372-93 (1994) (dis
cussing income sharing proposals).
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contributions of the lower-earning spouse, and is based on the spouses'
"responsibility for economic justice" which derives from their relation
ship (p. 190). The entitlement to alimony depends on the relationship
itself, and on the wife's contributions to the marriage.56 Alimony is
designed to provide a cushion for the transition from the marital
community to a single individual - the longer the marriage, the
longer the transition period (p. 191). The husband's financial obliga
tion to support his wife derives not just from his consent to the duties
of marriage, but also from the fact of the marriage itself, from the spe
cial duties that develop from intimate relationships. It follows that
marriage is more than an exchange.
The language of contract and property may in fact be richer than
this account indicates. In her trenchant critique of Regan's proposal,
Professor Carol Rose argues that his "supposedly relationship-based
alternatives still seem to have a great deal of resonance with prop
erty. "57 That is, his alternatives depend on spousal sharing, but the
basis for the sharing resembles a property or contractually based the
ory.ss
In their article advocating increased marital contracting, Professors
Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey Stake argue the spouse who invests in rela
tionships rather than market capital might want to protect herself at
the beginning of the marriage by binding her partner to an agreement
providing her with substantial protection in the event of a divorce.59
Contract may be more promising on these accounts because it can rec
ognize relationships. For groups who have historically been excluded
from making contracts or owning property in their own names, the
concepts have strong appeal.60

One of the problems with this proposal is that it may leave a 70-year-old woman with no
alimony. Cf. Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for
Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2505 (1994) (noting the limited duration of income-sharing pro
posals); Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1315 (1998) (noting the need for permanent alimony in some situations).
56. See Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers,
82 GEO. LJ. 2409, 2411-12 (1994) (reviewing Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers:
Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO L.J. 2303 (1994)). Rose characterizes
Regan's Spouses and Strangers as offering an alternative to property rhetoric in marriage
that is based on relationship, but she critiques it as not being very different from property
theory at all.
57. Id. at 2412. For a further defense of property as protective of women and their mari
tal relationships, see Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting
Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1575-96 (1998).
58. See Rose, supra note 56, at 2412.
59. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personal
izing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. LJ. 453, 466, 473 (1998); see also Jeffrey Stake, Pater
nalism in the Law ofMarriage, 74 IND. L.J. 801, 803 (1999).
60. For historical information, see Richard H. Chused, History's Double Edge: A Com
ment on Modernization ofMarital Status Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 2213 (1994); Richard H. Chused,
Married Women's Property Law: I800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, Home
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Moreover, Regan critiques the traditional law and economics mod
els, rather than the newer, sometimes even mildly feminist, approaches
which have developed as a way of recognizing the complicated nature
of marriage. While these feminist approaches do not resolve all of the
problems associated with the increasing emphasis on the external
stance, they do provide some softening of the traditional rhetoric of
the law and economics approach. Regan's criticisms would still pre
sumably apply to these newer approaches, but it is interesting to con
sider how they attempt to account for the internal, caring perspective
on marriage.
B. Approaching Marital Privileges
In addition to examining the economic discourses that are framing
marriage and marital dissolution, Regan uses the external and internal
stances to explore two different forms of the spousal testimonial
privilege. First, the adverse testimony privilege precludes one spouse
from testifying against another in criminal trials, except those involv
ing spousal abuse or abuses of either party's child. It takes the form of
either a complete bar against adverse spousal testimony, unless the
defendant spouse consents, in a minority of state courts, or of permit
ting a witness-spouse to choose not to testify in most other state and
federal courts. Under the traditional rule, the potential testimony
must actually be adverse.61 The rationale has been that the privilege
serves to promote marital harmony. Second, the communications
privilege prevents the disclosure of interspousal confidential commu
nications that occurred during the marriage, and is generally available
in both federal and state courts. Although the traditional rule allowed
either spouse to claim the privilege, some jurisdictions allow only the
communicating spouse to claim the privilege.6 2 This privilege has tra
ditionally been supported as encouraging openness between the
spouses.

as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880,
103 YALE LJ. 1073 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization ofMarital Status Law: Adju
dicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994) (hereinafter Siegel,
Modernization].
This is similar to the claims of some critical race theorists that "rights" are important.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal St11dies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 306-07 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking
to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 357
(1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 432-33 (1987).
61. See Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1563, 1568 (1985).
62 See id. at 1571-72.
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The spousal privileges may have no direct impact on an ongoing
marriage and Regan questions whether spouses actually know of the
existence of the privileges (except when there is a pending criminal
prosecution). He argues that they are important as cultural symbols of
the meaning of marriage. The privileges illustrate the external and
internal approaches to marriage by establishing priorities between the
individual spouse and the marital unit (p. 95).
He characterizes the traditional and minority forms of the adverse
testimony privilege as reflecting the internal stance toward marriage,
because they depend only on the existence of the marriage, not also on
the consent of the spouses (p. 102). While, as an individual, the wit
ness spouse63 might be willing to testify, the fact of the marriage pre
cludes her from testifying and overrides her own preferences. Because
she is a member of the marital community, rather than an autonomous
individual, she cannot testify under any circumstances; the mere status
of marriage precludes her from testifying. The diminishing availability
of this privilege reflects, then, some diminution in the respect accorded
the internal stance.
By contrast, he characterizes the communications privilege as ex
ternally based. While it could be seen as the type of contract to which
any reasonable spouse would consent (p. 98), it also depends on the
state of mind of the communicating spouse: he must have intended
that the communication be confidential (pp. 99-100). Consequently,
not all marital communications are privileged. The privilege requires
that the communicator signal an expectation of confidentiality and
that the recipient give reason to believe that she will treat the commu
nication as privileged. Only after a series of voluntary acts, then, will
the privilege attach. This privilege remains strong within American
evidentiary law, a reflection of the authority of the external stance (p.

102).
Given that the communications privilege attaches only to married
spouses, and is not available to business partners, I am not certain that
it should be characterized as an example of the external stance toward
marriage. Indeed, the communications privilege could just as easily be
characterized as internal. Based on the privilege, there is a presump
tion that communications occurring during a marriage are confidential,
thereby protecting the spouses based simply on their married status.64
Moreover, the communications privilege survives the dissolution of

63. The witness-spouse is generally the wife. See Margaret J. Chriss, Troubling Degrees
ofAuthority: The Continuing Pursuit of Unequal Marital Roles, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 225, 231
n.37 {1993) (citing historical co=entary on the paucity of cases involving male witnesses
compared to those involving female witnesses); id. at 247 n.129 (noting that, as of 1990, there
were almost ten times as many male prison inmates as female prison inmates).
64. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, STUDENT
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.05[3][b], at 18-55 {4th ed. 1999).
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the marriage, while the adverse testimonial privilege does not.65 This
survival of the communications privilege, therefore, shows the con
tinuing connection between the divorced spouses, while the lack of the
adverse testimonial privilege indicates legal treatment of the spouses
as strangers rather than as (at least formerly) connected individuals.
Further, the adverse testimony privilege is available only in criminal
cases, while the communications privilege can be invoked in civil or
criminal cases.66
Regardless of whether each can be characterized as external or in
ternal, Regan's ultimate conclusion is that the adverse testimony
privilege deserves more respect because of its protection of an internal
stance toward marriage (p. 133). He recognizes that the privilege has
traditionally worked to women's disadvantage, because it is more
likely to preclude wives, rather than husbands, from testifying.67
Nonetheless, he argues that this cost may be justified by the benefits of
continuing the privilege. First, the adverse testimony privilege does
not apply in cases involving intraspousal abuse.68 Moreover, he argues
that even as it reinforces an internal stance, it does not force women to
remain in a marriage.69
The adverse testimony privilege, rather than forcing people to re
main married, emerges as an expression of important cultural values
within marriage. Ultimately, Regan is concerned about spouses who
remain as autonomous selves during marriage and who seek to mini-

65. See id. at 18-57.
66. An alternative perspective on the privilege suggests that it does not foster marital
harmony so much as it preserves the loyalty that has been created. See, e.g., Amanda H.
Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered Rationale, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 5 (1999).
67. P. 128. For feminist critiques of the privilege, see, for example, Chriss, supra note
63, at 251-54; see also Daniel Ortiz, Making Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2157 (1995) (discussing
Regan's approach and noting the numerous potential dangers of not allowing women to
testify against their spouses).
68. P. 131. This is not, however, universally true. In Maryland, for example, the adverse
testimonial privilege is available the first time a defendant is charged with spousal abuse. See
MD. CODE ANN. § 9-106(a)(2) (1998).
69. P. 132. Professor Regan points out:
[I] t would be entirely rational for many women to resist th[e internal] stance, because the
vulnerability that it involves would be exacerbated by the lesser amount of power and re
sources wives tend to possess compared to their husbands. This suggests that genuine equal
ity between husbands and wives is necessary before women can embrace the internal stance
without acute reservations. To the extent that the adverse testimony privilege reinforces
gender inequality between the spouses, it therefore could have the overall effect of under
mining, rather than promoting, an internal stance toward marriage. I suggest that the danger
of this is less than the danger that the incrimination will undermine a norm of spousal loy
alty. This conclusion, however, is admittedly tentative.

P. 33. As I discuss later, an internal stance on the testimonial privilege is particularly dan
gerous in domestic abuse situations. See infra notes 135-137.
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mize or even avoid any form of vulnerability to each other; he is fur
ther concerned with marriage as an expression of our cultural values.
II.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STANCES ON THE BOOK

Through this book, Professor Regan seeks to remind us that mar
riage is not just a vehicle for self-fulfillment, but that it is the creation
of a community and of an entity that differs from the individual identi
ties of the two spouses. Rather than focus on the rights of the two
autonomous individuals who marry each other, he examines the com
munity formed through marriage and seeks to reinforce that commu
nity. His arguments run counter to those of many family law commen
tators who applaud the move to contract.70
He asks, "Why Marriage?," and responds that marriage continues
to have "powerful cultural power as the paradigm of intimate com
mitment" (pp. 6-7). He defends marriage against the claim that it has
supported patriarchy by arguing that there have been significant
changes in the laws that once enabled marriage to serve as a subordi
nating institution; it is now a more egalitarian relationship.71 Finally,
he explains that he is focusing on the married couple, rather than the
married couple with children, because he wants to examine the institu
tion of marriage regardless of whether there are children involved (p.
9). He points out that the decision to marry is no longer a simultane
ous decision to have children, or vice versa. By separating out chil
dren from his consideration of marriage, he hopes to show the tensions
- in family life and law - between choice and community. The irony
of a lack of interest in marriage without children, he suggests, is that
this view depends on an analysis of marriage as a privately ordered
relationship, while it has historically served as a symbol of the connec
tions inherent in family life (pp. 9-10).
Many other commentators who have looked at marriage have been
concerned with a marriage plus children, or they have been concerned
with divorce, the dissolution of marriage. Alone Together is different
because it focuses on marriage per se, and on the contemporary dis-

70. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1998); see
also Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 59; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Mod
ern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 687 (suggesting that liberalism, and its corresponding
emphasis on individual choice, may actually accord with co=unitarian values because lib
eralism can support family bonds and responsibilities); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Con
tractual Ordering ofMarriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982);
see generally Murphy, supra note 51 (discussing the move to contract and the establishment
of rights within marriage).
71. Pp. 7-8. In his earlier book, he endorsed gay marriage. See REGAN, FAMILY LAW,
supra note 5, at 120-22.
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courses that define and shape the theory of marriage independent of
any other factor, such as children.
Turning to each of Regan's purposes for focusing on marriage, I
simply want to raise some questions. First, it is true that marriage con
tinues to retain powerful symbolic value. Historically, it has served to
determine identity. Today, ask any advocate - or any opponent - of
same-sex marriage about the cultural significance of marriage and the
answer will illustrate marriage's significance. Proponents of gay mar
riage argue that marriage is a key part of citizenship,72 carries an im
portant philosophical recognition of the relationship,73 and offers sub
stantial economic and practical advantages.74 Within the gay commu
nity, there are questions as to whether the recognition of gay marriage
leads to uncritical acceptance of dominant legal models and coopta
tion.75 Opponents outside the gay community argue that marriage is
historically, traditionally, and culturally defined as being a heterosex
ual relationship.76 Philosophically, they argue that marriage must in
volve procreation and child-rearing.77 They believe that a heterosex-

72 See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1181 (1999) ("By expressly disallowing same-sex unions, the state
devalues the lives of its gay and lesbian citizens, denying their very citizenship in a vital re
spect that others take for granted."); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on
Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 165 (1996) ("There is no doubt
that marriage currently represents the social and legal badge of full citizenship.").
73. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry,
OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, 12-13:
Marriage is much more than a relationship sanctioned by law. It is the centerpiece of our en
tire social structure, the core of the traditional notion of 'family.' Even in its present tar
nished state, the marital relationship inspires sentiments suggesting that it is something al
most suprahuman. The Supreme Court, in striking down an anti·contraception statute in
1965, called marriage 'noble' and 'intimate to the degree of being sacred' . • . • Lesbians and
gay men are now denied entry to this 'noble' and 'sacred' institution. The implicit message is
this: two men or two women are incapable of achieving such an exalted domestic state. Gay
relationships are somehow less significant, less valuable. Such relationships may, from time
to time and from couple to couple, give the appearance of a marriage, but they can never be
of the same quality or importance.
74. See id. at 10 (highlighting the ability to inherit without a will or gain health insurance
from a spouse's employer).
75. See, e.g., Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17, 20 n.14, 21 (1999); Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask
For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of
Gender in Every Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 {1993) ("I believe that the desire to
marry in the lesbian and gay co=unity is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream
society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution . . . .").
76. See Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a
Retreatfrom Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 748-751 (1998).
77. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 72-73 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting)
(quoting Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1 187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974)).
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ual relationship is uniquely beneficial to society and therefore must be
protected.78
Notwithstanding the cultural significance of marriage, however, the
rate of marriage varies quite dramatically depending on race and class,
and the increasing number of cohabitating couples does raise issues
about the continuing significance of marriage. Slightly more than one
third of all black women are married, while almost 60% of white
women are married;79 34.7% of people between the ages of twenty-five
to thirty-four had never been married, but 53.4% of African
Americans in that age group had never been married.80
Among poor people, the marriage rate is extremely low. Only
about 35% of poor people live in married couple families, compared
to almost 73% of the nonpoor.81 As Rebecca Blank suggests, "[t]he

78. See Wardle, supra note 76, at 749 ("But no other companionate relationship pro
vides the same great potential for benefiting individuals and society as the heterosexual
covenant union we call marriage, and that is why only committed heterosexual unions are
given the legal status of marriage."); see also Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Consti
tutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 29 ("Although the Constitution
does not mention the word marriage, marriage is undeniably deeply imbedded in the tradi
tions of our nation and essential to the ordered liberty of nations. Indeed, marriage status is
the ultimate example of long-established, highly preferred public status. It is official, formal,
publicly endorsed, and powerfully protected.").
79. See Popenoe & Whitehead, supra note 15, fig. 2. In a study of the attitudes of
African-American women toward marriage (316 respondents), the comparatively Jess edu
cated and lower income respondents expressed more negative attitudes toward marriage
than did wealthier and more highly educated women. See Anthony E.O. King, African
American Females' Attitudes Towards Marriage: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BLACK STUD.
416, 431 (1999); see generally DONNA FRANKLIN, ENSURING INEQUALITY: THE STRUC
TURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY (1997).



80. See TERRY A. LUGALIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE: CURRENT POPULA
TION REPORTS, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE)
(1998). Professor Donna Franklin notes that the number of black men involved with the
criminal justice system, together with the inadequacy of job opportunities available for black
men, has decreased the number of marriageable black men. See FRANKLIN, supra note 79, at
219. In a study of 415 black men from Chicago, researchers found that black men who had
stable jobs were twice as likely to get married as were black men who were not employed, in
school, or in the military. See Mark Testa & Marilyn Krogh, The Effect of Employment on
Marriage Among Black Males in Inner-City Chicago, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE
AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 59, 93 (M. Belinda Tucher & Qaudia Mitchell-Kernan eds.,

1995).
There is a long-term difference between the white and black marriage rates. Indeed, the
lower rate of "legitimate" black marriage was used by segregationists as an example of black
immorality. See generally Anders Walker, Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists
Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education,
47 DUKE L.J. 399, 406-08 (1997). See also Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Recon
struction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251

(1999).
81. See REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING
POVERTY 17 (1997). Poor People are defined as those individuals with a family income be
low the poverty line. See id. at 15. Only 15.1 % of "current" (as of 1997) welfare recipients
are married compared to 28% of former recipients. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE, ASSESSING
THE NEW FEDERALISM 3 (Nov. 1999). For further discussion of poor single mothers, see
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fact that so many women choose to live extremely poor lives as single
mothers suggests that marriage is unattractive to these women, for
reasons we should take seriously. "82
The number of cohabitating couples is dramatically increasing:
approximately 35% of people born in the 1960s were expected to co
habit by the age of twenty-five, compared to fewer than 8 % of those
born in the 1940s.83 One study found that cohabitation is more attrac
tive than marriage for couples who do not want to feel "constrain[ed]"
by marital roles in which men are breadwinners and women are
homemakers.84 For people in these relationships, the study suggests
that the ideology and structure of marriage is thus less appealing for
people choosing to cohabit.
The number of children born outside of marriage continues to in
crease. In 1990, almost 70% of births to teenagers were nonmarital
births, while 25% of births to women between the ages of twenty to
forty-four were nonmarital;85 about one-third of all births occur to un
married women.86 The meaning and significance of marriage thus
varies, depending on many cultural variables.
It is worth asking whether the need to balance the internal and ex
ternal stances also varies depending on socioeconomic culture; indeed,
the applications of the stances discussed in Alone Together have vary
ing amounts of relevance. Thinking about the internal and external
stances outside of a white middle-class culture provides some support
for Regan's critiques of the cultural movement toward autonomous
individuals within marriage. Where there is no money, a law and eco
nomics perspective is of even more doubtful utility in describing mar
riage than it is in a marriage of middle-class or wealthy individuals.
Concepts of human capital, of allowing one spouse to specialize in
household labor and the other in market labor are generally inappli
cable where both spouses must work.87 Similarly, the property rhetoric
Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images ofMotherhood: Conflicting Definitions From Welfare "Re
form, " Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 708 nn.86-89 (1998).

82. BLANK, supra note 81, at 42. This phenomenon, she suggests, may be attributed to
the increases in women's wages and the decrease in men's wages, as well as the reduction in
the stigma attached to single motherhood. See id.
83. See Marin Clarkberg et al., Attitudes, Values, and Entrance into Cohabitational Versus Marital Unions, 74 Soc. FORCES 609, 609 (1995).

84. See id. at 624.
85. See BLANK, supra note 81, at 33.
86. See Linda Waite, The Importance of Marriage is Being Overlooked, USA TODAY,
Jan. 1999 (Magazine), at 46.
87. This is not to say that there is not a gendered allocation of household roles in such a
marriage, but merely that both spouses must develop marketable skills. For a discussion of
the gendered household roles regardless of employment outside of the home, see FRANCINE
DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED PARENTING WORKS (1999); see also
Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender, Class, and Inter
personal Power, 10 GENDER & SOC'Y 527 {1996); WILLIAMS, supra note 52.
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concerning divorce has little descriptive and rhetorical power where
there is no property or where low wages are insufficient to support
even one person.88 Turning to the spousal privilege, it may have some
rhetorical power within poor marriages. Given the percentage of
black men involved in the criminal justice system compared to the per
centage of white men,89 however, spousal privilege may have a dispro
portionate impact on black women.
For poor people, the law often promotes an internal stance that is
damaging to the family. The financial impact of getting married can
be severe. When public welfare recipients marry, the inclusion of their
spouses' income may result in their being denied any further public
benefits; there is a presumption of sharing.90 Marriage fosters the pri
vatization of their dependency.91 For working-class poor people, the
structure of the Earned Income Tax Credit creates a marriage pen
alty.92 The credit was originally designed to help ease the work disin
centives for poor households with children and it accords insufficient
attention to the needs of poor two-earner marriages, punishing them
instead.93 Professor Dorothy Brown also points out that the marriage

88. Professor Martha Ertman has suggested that the rhetoric of money has some utility
even for poor families who divorce; the spouses can divide debt, rather than income. See
Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 7 7 TEXAS L. REV. 17, 22, 105 (1998). Even this
proposal, however, has some flaws because a very poor individual can file for bankruptcy.
Conversation with Professor Lucy Williams, Northwestern University School of Law (June
1999).
89. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors
are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV. 705 (1999); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the
Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660 (1996) (reviewing MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995)).
90. See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (197 7) (upholding provision in the Social
Security Act terminating benefits for dependent child when the child marries someone ineli
gible for benefits).
91. See Dubler, supra note 28; Ariela Dubler,
(forthcoming May 2000).

Wifely Behavior,

100 COLUM. L.

REV.

92 See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 194 (1997) (arguing that current tax
laws serve to "penaliz[e] marriage among the poor") [hereinafter MCCAFFERY, TAXING
WOMEN]; Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REV. 445, 484-85
(1999) [hereinafter McCaffery, Burdens]; see generally Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and
Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469,
1479-81 (1997) [hereinafter Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism].
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a tax credit that "is 'refundable,' meaning that
if the amount of credit that a family qualifies for exceeds the family's tax liability, the federal
government will make a payment to the family of that excess amount." Mark Greenberg,
Welfare Restructuring and Working-Poor Family Policy, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND
WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 24, 28 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999). In
1996, "the EITC provided its maximum assistance to a family in the $8,890 to $11,160 range."

Id.
93.

See McCaffery, Burdens, supra note 92,

at 481-91.
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penalty disproportionately affects black families.94 This is because the
marriage penalty affects couples who are equal earners, and black
families are more likely than white families to have equally contribut
ing earners.95 Getting married is, in some senses, resistance against an
external stance because the spouses are focusing on the relationship,
not the economic realities.
Black women are much more likely to work than are white women,
and their wages are far closer to black men's than are white women's
to white men's.96 Within married households, black women earn ap
proximately 40% of their household's income, while white women
earn only about 29%.97 Equalizing income post-divorce, then, is not as
important for African-American women. Indeed, Professor Twila
Perry challenges the attention given by family law scholars to the justi
fications for alimony:
[T]he marriage paradigm that has, to a great extent, shaped the discourse
on developing a theory of alimony . . . has the potential to reinforce the
subordination and marginalization of black women in two ways: first, by
reinforcing privilege or an image of privilege for middle and upper
middle class white women in both marriage and divorce, and second, by
reinforcing a hierarchy among women in which their value is determined
by the presence or absence of legal ties to men, particularly affluent
men.98

Perry argues that theories of alimony premised upon images of a
breadwinner husband and a lesser-earning spouse do not apply to
most black marriages.99 There is something strange, then, about
spending so much time and attention on something that affects rela
tively few divorcing black couples (and non-black couples as well).
Moreover, the external stance, as represented by the law and eco
nomics discourse, may also be more complex as applied to African
American families.100 From an external stance, it makes little eco
nomic sense for some black couples to marry.101
94. See Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First Century: What's Tax
Policy Got to Do With It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 759, 760 (1999) [hereinafter Brown,
Racial Equality]; Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism, supra note 92, at 1498-99.
95.

See Brown, Racial Equality, supra note 94, at 760.

See Dorothy A. Brown,
L. REV. 787, 795-96 (1997).
96.

97.

The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN.

See id. at 793.

98. Perry, supra note 55, at 2484.
99.

See id. at 2493-94.

100. Professor Richard Delgado provides one of the few critical race critiques of law and
economics. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics
ofRace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1 183, 1202 (1993) (book review) ("[L]aw and economics is . . . [a]
useful way of ordering relations and transactions within a given system . . . but a poor way of
understanding and dealing with broad, systemic distortions built into the very structure of
that system."); see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for
Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 215 (1998) (book review).
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The negative aspects of the class and race nature of marriage sug
gest the importance of looking at alternatives to marriage and of cre
ating community within those relationships. Recognizing intimacy
between adults may involve changes in laws governing cohabitation.
An increasing number of jurisdictions are providing protection for on
going adult intimate relationships through domestic partnership ordi
nances, but the scope of these protections varies dramatically.102 Laws
governing the rights of cohabitants upon dissolution, especially, re
main in disarray. In some states, cohabitants can sue each other on a
variety of theories, while other states provide little recognition to any
rights.103 Imposing the obligations of marriage upon cohabitants could
cause these relationships to be treated more like marriage, and might
foster a sense of interdependence.104
The differential rates of marriage also suggest the importance of
familial relationships other than those between intimate adults, such as
those between parents and children, or between grandparents and
children.105 Indeed, Regan's focus on marriage occurs as other schol
arly commentators are questioning the continuing validity of marriage.
Professor Martha Fineman advocates the abolition of marriage as a
legally privileged unit, although not the abolition of marriage itself.106

One possible interpretation, supported by an economic approach, is that some black
women are likely to gain little from marriage to an unemployed black man. See David M.
Heer, Commentary, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS, supra
note 80, at 117, 118-19.
101. In commenting on this paper, Professor Katharine Baker asks: "Is part of what is
going on that an internal stance requires an acceptance of vulnerability that many people
cannot afford - they are already made too vulnerable by race, class, etc.?" Conversation
with Professor Katharine Baker, Chicago-Kent College of Law (May 2000).
Available research does not show that loss of public welfare benefits upon marriage has
caused a decline in marriage. See Lynn C. Burbridge, Policy Implications of a Decline in
Marriage Among African-Americans, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN
AMERICANS, supra note 80, at 323, 330.
102. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lambda Legal Issue: Domestic
Partnership (visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/issues/
record?record=3>, for discussion of a range of issues involving domestic partnerships.
103. For a listing of the various types of relief available in each state, see Katherine C.
Gordon, Note, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: When Strings
Will Attach and How to Prevent Them - A State Survey, 37 BRANDEIS LJ. 245 (1998-99).
104. More than a decade ago, Professor Ellen Kandoian asked, "[w]hy not . . . support
those parties who are in fact committed" rather than simply those who are married? Ellen
Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility ofa Shared Moral Life,
75 GEO LJ. 1829, 1872 (1987).
105. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), cert granted sub nom. Troxel
v. Granville, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-138). See also Karen Czapanskiy,
Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 1315 (1994) (arguing for "co-guardianship" contracts between parents and grandpar
ents who act as co-parents).
106. See FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 228-30; Ann Shalleck, Presentation at The Associa
tion of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (January 1998).
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She argues that relationships between intimate adults should be sub
ject to the legal norms applicable to nonintimate relationships,107
thereby encouraging an external approach to adult intimacy. On the
other hand, she would protect the caretaker-child unit, promoting an
internal stance on that relationship.108 Professor June Carbone argues
that the relationship between the spouses has become less important
than the relationship between parent and child, and that family law
should seek to encourage parents' continuing investment in their chil
dren.109
In addition, a new focus on vertical intimacy as well as horizontal
intimacy110 would recognize the realities of the many families formed
without marriage. The exclusive focus of familial responsibilities is no
longer the marital unit. Instead, as discussed earlier, the parent-child
unit has also become a focus of familial obligations.111 This is particu
larly true for poor and black families.
Second, while the laws surrounding marriage are gender-neutral,
and refer to "spouses" rather than to "husband and wife,"112 marriage
remains a gendered institution. Women disproportionately continue
to perform the second shift.113 Where there are children, women do
the primary work of caring for the children, as well as household work.
Even with childless couples, women disproportionately perform the
household labor.114 Although more married women are working,
women are disproportionately employed in part-time labor, and they
remain more likely than men to take off time during their work lives.115
107. She suggests that the assumptions of these other laws, such as notions of an "arms
length transaction," should also be revised in order to reflect the realities of inequality. See
FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 229-30.
108. See id. at 231.
109. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 323-42 (Chapter 23, "Conclu
sion: From Partners to Parents: The Ongoing Revolution") (forthcoming 2000).
110. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1525-26 (defining horizontal relationships as those
between adults who decide to form a family through marriage, and vertical relationships as
those between children and individuals with parental rights).
111. See generally CARBONE, supra note 109.
112 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down a statute that allowed ali
mony only for wives, not husbands).
113. The second shift involves work performed at home outside of the external work
place. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT {1989); see also WILLIAMS, supra note
52, at 13-31 {Chapter 1, "Is Domesticity Dead?"); Silbaugh, Commodification, supra note 41.
1 14. See SANnv GUPTA, What Makes Men Change Their Housework Time? (1999)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor)) (on file with the
University of Michigan Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library).
115. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52; infra notes 122-126 and accompanying text. Seventy
percent of part time workers are women. See AFL-CIO, Working Women: Equal Pay Facts About Working Women, (visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.aflcio.org/women/wwfacts.
htln>. Women are more likely to disrupt their work lives. See Hearings Before the Sub
comm on Oversight ofthe House Ways and Means Comm. (statements of Leslie Kramerich);
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Also, upon divorce, the standard of living for women decreases, while
that for men increases; one of the most common reasons for women to
become first-time welfare recipients is separation or divorce.116 Re
gardless of the phrasing of the laws governing marriage, women re
main in subordinate positions in marriage.
The rhetoric of domesticity, while no longer explicitly enforced
through law, retains force through its gendered expectations of care
takers as opposed to workers.117 Even though laws no longer literally
reinforce patriarchy, the dominance of the husband's role is supported
through "emotion"118 and social constraints: women continue to view
themselves as caretakers of both husbands and children, and make
decisions to support that role. As Rhona Mahoney shows, women
train themselves to become the primary caretaker, long before they
find a partner, by the choices they make with respect to education and
work.119 Girls' decisions not to take math in high school are directly
related to the profession that they. will ultimately choose. These deci
sions will cause them - not the fathers - to drop out of the work
place.120 Although workplace participation by women with young
children has increased dramatically,121 women are far more likely to
work part-time.122 More than two-thirds of all part-time workers are

Impacts of the Current Social Security System: Hearings Before the Soc. Sec. of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 97 (1999) (statement of Joan Entmacher, Vice
President and Director, Family Econ. Sec. Nat'l Women's Law Ctr.).
116. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, INDICATORS OF WELFARE
DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1998, at 11-24.
117. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
118. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 16, 38 (discussing the enforcement of domesticity
through emotion and "choice rhetoric"); Siegel, supra note 60, at 2168-69 (describing how
courts preserved a wife's common law duties in their application of the legislature's ostensi
ble transformation of the marriage relationship); see also DEUTSCH, supra note 87, at 73-81
(discussing ways in which men reinforce women's identification with the household and chil
dren by failing to take responsibility).
119. See RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND
POWER (1995). Law and economics scholars, as well as their critics, have
looked at the family to examine the alleged logic of role differentiation. See, e.g., Jana B.
Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM. L.Q. 119
(1997).
BARGAINING

120. See MAHONY, supra note 119, at 137. She recommends that parents who want their
daughters to have financial independence should "insist on one simple discipline: that their
daughters take at least three years of math in high school." Id.
121. See Kristin McCue & Manuelita Ureta, Women in ihe Workplace: Recent Eco
nomic Trends, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 125, 135-36 (1995).
·

122 See Social Security and Women: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security
of the House Ways and Means Comm., lOlst Cong. (statement of Joan Entmacher, Vice
President, National Women's Law Center) (42% of mothers with children under six were
employed full-time compared to 90% of fathers with children under six, and 18 % of mothers
with children under six, compared to 3% of such fathers, were employed part-time); Ann
Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for Women Workers, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 799, 803-04 (1995).
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women, and women constitute almost 70 % of all "voluntary" part
time workers.123 Women between the ages of twenty-five and forty
four are more than eight times as likely as men of the same age to
work part-time, and the data suggest that this is due to childrearing
responsibilities and choices.124 The majority of women with children
younger than five either stay at home or work part-time.125 Only 2%
of fathers of pre-schoolers, compared to 20 % of mothers, allowed
child-related concerns to affect their work schedules.126 Men also re
tain control over most of the financial incidents of marriage.127
Thus, within marriage, women seemingly "choose," or assume, a
role associated with the internal stance of connection and community
and interdependency. This concept of choice, of course, fails to recog
nize the constructed nature of women's choices.128 Indeed, the rhetoric
of choice diverts attention from the constraints surrounding any par
ticular decision, and onto the actual action of making choices.129 That
is, instead of looking at what is chosen, we need to examine the pa
rameters in which choice occurs, the ideologies that structure any par
ticular "choice." At the same time, however, there is debate over
whether an acknowledgment that ideology figures in choices implies
that individuals have no control over their lives.130
For purposes of discussing the internal and external stances associ
ated with marriage, what is important is acknowledging the imbalance
123. See Bookman, supra note 122, at 804. Voluntary part-time workers are those who
have chosen, for whatever reason, not to work full-time. See Ame L. Kalleberg, Part-Time
Work and Workers in the United States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 771, 776 (1995).
124. See id. at 775.
125. Homing in on Motherhood: Stay-at-home Mothers, 66 MOTHERING 32 (1993).
126. See Ellis Cose, The Daddy Trap: After All the Talk About Equality of the Sexes, a
Man is Still Expected to Be the Breadwinner, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 1995, (Magazine), at 16
(citing 1991 Census Bureau survey).
127. While there are little good data on this, anecdotal evidence supports the few studies
that do exist. See Carole B. Burgoyne, Money in Marriage: How Patterns ofAllocation Both
Reflect and Conceal Power, 38 Soc. REV. 634 (1990); Jan Pahl, The A/location ofMoney and
the Structuring ofInequality Within Marriage, 31 Soc. REV. 237 (1983).
128. See Murphy, supra note 81, at 724; Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and
Work: Judicial Interpretations ofSex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising
the Lack ofInterest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990); Wax, Caring Enough, supra
note 46; Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1559 (1991); Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on
Choice in the Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1369 (1992)
(book review); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 217 (1987)
(exploring issues of false consciousness).
129. See Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80
GEO. LJ. 2093 (1992); Williams, supra note 128, at 1564.
130. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52; Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24
GA. L. REV. 761, 795 (1990); Juditlt G. Greenberg, Introduction to MARY JOE FRUG,
POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM ix, xxix (1992).
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in the relationship in which women live in an internal marriage and
focus on intimacy, while men live in an external marriage and focus on
rights. Professor Robin West argues that women differ from men in
their valuing of intimacy.131 "Women's coni::ept of value revolves . . .
around the axis of intimacy, nurturance, community, responsibility,
and care," while men are more concerned with autonomy and separa
tion.132 Like Carol Gilligan, West identifies women with connection to
others, and men with individualism.133 Intimacy thus can be seen, at
least in some senses, as a gendered value. Indeed, historical images
from the nineteenth century of white, middle-class women have identi
fied them with intimacy, and have placed women and intimacy within
the domain of the family, in contrast to the male, cold-blooded mar
ketplace.134
Moreover, women have gained some form of power through their
nurturing roles, a power that has both positive and negative attributes.
Acting as the relationship-centered spouse is an extremely rewarding
role, even as it is simultaneously a "confining" position that may also
serve to preclude men from assuming the same role.135 At the same
time, connection can be dangerous for women.136 Indeed, for victims
of domestic violence, the internal stance is particularly problematic.137
Focusing on the relationship rather than on their needs may lead
women to stay with an abuser rather than to leave the relationship.
The association of women with intimacy and men with justice is
neither inevitable, unvarying, nor immutable. Nonetheless, marriage

131. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinaf
ter West, Jurisprudence]; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Bedonie Lives: A Phe
nomenological Critique ofFeminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
132. West, Jurisprudence, supra note 131, at 28.
133. See GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE supra note 31; Gilligan, Remapping, supra note
31.
134. See, e.g., NANCY F. COIT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN
NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 {1983); Williams, supra note 117. For a
discussion that focuses on black women, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial
Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEM. 51 (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women ofColor, Equality, and the Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419 (1991).
135. For a discussion of the complexities associated with women's internal stance toward
their families, see Naomi R. Cahn, Women's Work: The Powers of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L.
& FEM. (forthcoming Fall 2000).
136. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 3-4, 10 {1997).
137. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1554-55; see generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Im
ages of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(stating that women are most at danger in abusive relationships when they leave, asserting
their autonomous rights to violence-free lives).
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remains a gendered138 institution in which women remain more likely
to exhibit an internal stance toward creating and nurturing the family,
and men are more likely to exhibit an external stance by focusing on
work outside of the home. The man's role remains the breadwinner,
while the woman's role remains the nurturer. Perhaps a better bal
ancing of the internal and external stances could be achieved by a
gendered strategy that encouraged men to focus on the marriage, and
women to focus on themselves.139
Like Professor Regan, however, I believe that marriage serves im
portant intimacy goals for women.140 Thus, to the extent that marriage
continues as a significant cultural institution, the goal should be to fos
ter in men the same commitment to intimacy and to the internal stance
that women have traditionally experienced. A focus on the internal
stance for men might involve, on a practical level, more time spent on
housework and child care and relationship-building. Focus on the ex
ternal stance for women might involve less time on household-related
chores and caretaking together with more leisure time; it need not
necessarily involve increased workforce participation.141
To be sure, Regan does not advocate the abandonment of an ex
ternal stance toward marriage and complete acquiescence to an inter
nal stance. Instead, he argues for the importance of acknowledging
the tensions between the stances. As Regan recognizes, there are par
ticular dangers for women from the internal stance, and benefits from
the external stance, that must be recognized (pp. 59-61, 128-33).
While the number of marriages without children is increasing, it
remains true that an overwhelming percentage of all married couples
have, or have had, children.142 Children remain an incredibly impor
tant part of any marriage that can change the dynamics of the relation-

138. I feel compelled to add in the requisite "gender" footnote. The behavior I am dis
cussing is gendered female or male, even though not all men and not all women exhibit such
behavior.
139. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1552-54 (discussing how women's connectedness may
be a detriment in marriage). As is clear, I agree with Professor Baker on the need for
women to become stronger advocates for themselves. I think, in addition, that men must
focus on the relationship and develop a stronger sense of the internal stance.
140. By contrast, Professor Baker suggests that "the primary advantages that privileging
the marital bond hold for men are relatively less important for women because the expres
sive and constituent roles that marriage serves for men are relatively less important for
women, who have other relationships that serve this purpose." Baker, supra note 57, at
1557. That is, she believes that women will continue to want the intimacy of marriage, but
that marriage-associated intimacy is less important for women than for men, because men
have had fewer experiences with intimacy and personal communication.
141. See Baker, supra note 57, at 1575-96 for further suggestions; Joan Williams has
suggested the need for restructuring the workplace so it is no longer designed around a male
breadwinner relying on a stream of domestic services. See WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 65.
142. The number of children born outside of marriage also indicates the independence
of marriage from children.
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ship. The existence of children within a marriage does provide sup
port for Regan's call for more balance between the two different
stances, which involves more attention to the internal stance of mar
riage. There may be less of a need to de-emphasize the external
stance when it comes to children, because family members have al
ready followed the internal stance by making a decision to care for
someone else. As a culture, however, we inadequately promote the
connection between parents and children by, for example, separating
poor parents and their children143 and by fostering a work ethic that
distances parents and children.144
On the other hand, given that couples are less willing now than in
the past to stay together for the sake of their children, there may still
be a need to account for children within a marriage. In the first year
after a baby's birth, 70% of wives feel unhappy about their marriage.145
Gottman and Silver believe that the underlying reason for this unhap
piness is that husbands have not shared in the transformation that par
enthood brings.146 Moreover, as discussed earlier, the existence of
children might lead to a greater imbalance within the marriage.
Women will be more likely to focus on the family and men on them
selves. Regardless of the reasons for this specialization - economic,
normative, constrained choices - it contributes to an unequal differ
entiation in approaches to marriage.
Thus, even when children are factored into marriage, the tension
between individual and community remains, and may even be exacer
bated. Not considering the role of children deprives an examination of
marriage of some of the richness and complexities of marriage itself;
the nature of marriage changes once children enter the picture.
Moreover, the existence of children may also support the proposition
that women need more of an external stance, while men need more of
an internal stance because of the caretaking role that mothers remain
more likely to assume. Thus, the balance needs to occur not just
within our laws and culture, but also within each marriage.
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE

Alone Together is an extremely thoughtful book that calls for more
societal and legal attention to the relationship of marriage than to the
rights of each individual spouse within marriage. Regan examines dif
ferent aspects of contemporary law and rhetoric that promote the in-

143. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty,
Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189 (1999); Catherine J. Ross, Placing Out, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1249 (1999).
144. See WEST, supra note 136, at 3; WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 64-113.
145. See GOITMAN & SILVER, supra note 1, at 211.
146. See id. at 212.
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terests of individual spouses at the expense of the sharing and interre
lationships that typify marriage.
Regan captures something profound about the discourses on con
temporary marriage through his exploration of the external and inter
nal stances. He suggests that his analysis applies to issues other than
the rhetoric of law and economics, the division of property at divorce,
or the understandings of the spousal testimonial privilege.
Indeed, the locations where the two different stances play out on a
day to day basis within marriage are not through the three issues
Regan discusses. Instead, the daily examples of the internal and ex
ternal stances occur in negotiations over who will do the grocery shop
ping, who will pick up the children from school, who will take out the
garbage, and whether there is enough money to pay the mortgage or
rent. In these interactions, I suspect that one spouse (probably,
although not necessarily the woman) focuses on the relationship, while
one spouse (probably, although not necessarily the man) focuses on
each individual's obligations.
In addition to the rhetoric outside of the marriage shifting to a
more internal focus, thereby reinforcing concepts of relationships and
self-in-context, I believe that each marriage must develop more "in
ternal" balance as well. This will generally mean that the gendered
female spouse must emphasize her rights as an individual, while the
gendered male spouse locates himself as part of a relationship.
The values associated with the internal and external stances on
marriage have deep resonance in a culture that has a historical com
mitment to recognizing individuals within communities. As Milton
Regan so eloquently reminds us, we must respect both individual and
community, even as we acknowledge the tensions. The tensions be
tween self and community, he points out, transcend family law.

